The races was considered illegal? As preposterous as this

 

 

 

 

The
Statutes

Laquosha Mack

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PAD 525 Assignment 2

Dr. Angela J Smith

January 26 , 2018

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Introduction

Was
there ever a time in history where multicultural marriages and sex among people
of diverse races was considered illegal? As preposterous as this idea may sounds,
the answer is yes. Surprisingly, less than 40 years ago marrying someone of a
different race was considered illegal. Black people could not be with white
people, nor could an Asian person be with a white person. Before the civil war majority of the sates in
the USA prohibited marriages between races. This was termed as “”intermarriage
or forms of illicit intercourse between the races.” During the
Reconstruction that happened in the southern states, none of the statutes
against miscegenation appear to have been repealed.” These statutes
date back to colonial times, during the 1600s, which is the time that helped to
maintain the racial caste system and expand slavery. Two particular landmark
cases convey the importance of Anti-Miscegenation Statutes in the United
States: Pace v. Alabama (1883) & Loving v. Virginia (1967). The 1883 case
upholds the constitutionality of anti-miscegenation statutes whereas the 1967
case affirms that these statutes are repugnant and unconstitutional. It is
important to review these two cases in depth in terms of their facts, issues at
hand, and their rulings. Pace v. Alabama & Loving v. Virginia have their
differences and similarities but can be considered influential on Brown v.
Board of Education and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOM).

Pace v. Alabama

Facts
of the case: In this case of Pace vs. Alabama, Section
4184 of the Code of Alabama states that “if any man and woman live together in
adultery or fornication, each of them must, on the first conviction of the
offense, be fined not less than $100, and may also be imprisoned in the county
jail or sentenced to hard labor for the county for not more than six months. On
the second conviction for the offense, with the same person, the offender must
be fined not less than $300, and may be imprisoned in the county jail, or
sentenced to hard labor for the county, for not more than 12 months; and for a
third or any subsequent conviction with the same person, must be imprisoned in
the penitentiary or sentenced to hard labor for the county for two years.”

In Section 4189 of the same Code it
declares that “if any white person and any negro, or the descendant of any
negro to the third generation, inclusive, though one ancestor of each
generation was a white person, intermarry or live in adultery or fornication
with each other, each of them must, on conviction, be imprisoned in the
penitentiary or sentenced to hard labor for the county for not less than two
nor more than seven years.” In November, 1881, the plaintiff in error, Tony
Pace, a negro man, and Mary J. Cox, a white woman, were indicted under section
4189, in a circuit court of Alabama, for living together in a state of adultery
or fornication, and were tried, convicted, and sentenced, each to two years’
imprisonment in the state penitentiary. On appeal to the supreme court of the
state the judgment was affirmed, and he brought the case here on writ of error,
insisting that the act under which he was indicted and convicted is in conflict
with the concluding clause of the first section of the fourteenth amendment of
the constitution, which declares that no state shall ‘deny to any person the
equal protection of the laws.’ 106 U.S. 583, 584  J. R. Tompkins, for plaintiff in error.

Issues:
The
counsel of the plaintiff in error compares sections 4184 and 4189 of the Code
of Alabama, and assuming that the latter relates to the same offense as the
former, and prescribes a greater punishment for it, because one of the parties
is a negro, or of negro descent, claims that a discrimination is made against
the colored person in the punishment designated, that conflicts with the clause
of the fourteenth amendment; prohibiting a state from denying to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The council is
undoubtedly correct in his view of the purpose of the clause of the amendment
in question, that it was to prevent hostile and discriminating state
legislation against any person or class of persons.

Equality of protection under the laws
implies not only accessibility by each one, regardless of their race, on the
same terms with others to the courts of the country for the security of his
person and property, but that in the administration of criminal justice he
shall not be subjected, for the same offense, to any greater or different
punishment. Such was the view of congress in the re-enactment of the
civil-rights act, after the adoption of the amendment. That act, after
providing that all persons within 106 U.S. 583, 585    the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right, in every state and territory, to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, declares that they shall be subject ‘to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and
none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary
notwithstanding.’ 16 Section.C. 114, 16.

The defect in the argument of counsel
consists in his assumption that any discrimination is made by the laws of
Alabama in the punishment provided for the offense for which the plaintiff in
error was indicted when committed by a person of the African race and when
committed by a white person. The two sections of the Code cited are entirely
consistent. The one prescribes, generally, a punishment for an offense
committed between persons of different sexes; the other prescribes a punishment
for an offense which can only be committed where the two sexes are of different
races. There is in neither section any discrimination against either race.
Section 4184 equally includes the offense when the persons of the two sexes are
both white and when they are both black. Section 4189 applies the same
punishment to offenders, the white and the black. Indeed, the offense against
which this latter section is aimed cannot be committed without involving the
persons of both races in the same punishment. Whatever discrimination is made
in the punishment prescribed in the two sections is directed against the
offense designated and not against the person of any particular color or race.
The punishment of each offending person, whether white or black is the same.
Ruling: Judgment was affirmed.

Loving vs. Virginia

Facts
of the case: In this case Loving vs. Virginia, Mildred
Jeter and her new husband, Richard Loving, returned to their home in Caroline
County, Virginia. The newlyweds had recently taken their vows in nearby
Washington, D.C. and were happy to begin their new life together as married
couple. But there was a big obstacle to their marital bliss. The year was 1958,
and Virginia was one of sixteen states that prohibited and punished interracial
marriages. Mildred was African American and her husband Richard was Caucasian.
Four months into their married life they were indicted by a grand jury.

Issues:
The
following January, the Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge and were sentenced
to one year in jail. The trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the
Lovings would leave the state for twenty-five years. The judge told Mr. and
Mrs. Loving: “Almighty God created the races…and he placed them on separate
continents…. The fact he separated the races shows that He did not intend for
the races to mix.” The Loving’s moved to Washington, D.C. and appealed their
conviction on the grounds that Virginia law, The Racial Integrity Law of 1924,
violated their rights to equal protection of the law and due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment.

Rule:
The
Supreme Court ruled unanimously to overturn their conviction and strike down
the Virginia law. The Court held, “There can be no doubt that restricting the
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.” The Court also found that the Virginia
law deprived the Loving’s of liberty without due process of law. “The freedom
to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. To deny this fundamental
freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications …is surely to
deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.”

Compare and contrast both
cases in regards to the Anti-Miscegenation Statutes.

In the case Pace v. Alabama, section 4184
of the Code of Alabama states that “if any man and woman live together in adultery
or fornication, each of them must, on the first conviction of the offense be
fined no less than $100 and may also be imprisoned in the county jail or
sentenced to hard labor for the county for not more than six months.” Also in
1883 the same code as stated above declares that ‘if any white person and any
negro, or the descendant of any negro to the third generation, inclusive,
though one ancestor of each generation was a white person, intermarry or live
in adultery or fornication with each other, each of them must, on conviction,
be imprisoned in the penitentiary or sentenced to hard labor for the county for
not less than two nor more than seven years’
(http://laws.findlaw.com/us/106/583.html).

In November 1881, the plaintiff in error,
Tony Pace, a negro man, and Mary J. Cox, a white woman, were indicted under
section 4189, in a circuit court of Alabama, for living together in a state of
adultery or fornication, and were tried, convicted, and sentenced, each to two
years of imprisonment in the state penitentiary
(http://laws.findlaw.com/us/106/583.html). On appeal to the Supreme Court of
the state the judgment was affirmed, Pace brought the case here on writ of
error, insisting that the act under which he was indicted and convicted is in
conflict with the concluding clause of the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution, which declares that no state shall ‘deny to any
person the equal protection of the laws’ 106 U.S. 583, 584.

 

In Loving v. Virginia originates from the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in 1967, very many years after Pace v.
Alabama. Once again, Anti-Miscegenation Statutes come back into the big
picture. This case is landmark in the sense that it presents a constitutional
question never presented in the courts in history: whether a statutory scheme
adopted by the State of Virginia to prevent marriages between persons solely on
the basis of racial classifications violates the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In June of 1958 two residents of
Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were
married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws and later returned to
Caroline County in the state of Virginia where they continued their lives as
husband and wife.

It
is apparent that both cases deal with Anti-Miscegenation Statutes. The Pace
case took place in Alabama in 1883 whereas the Lovings’ case took place in
Virginia in 1967 many years after. The Lovings’ case also took place during the
height of the Civil Rights Movement as well. A major difference between the two
cases is that Pace was charged with adultery and fornication whereas the
Lovings were charged with interracial marriage. Even though this case didn’t
directly address the act of interracial marriages, the State of Alabama went on
to condemn these marriages because the state was scared of the children that
may be produced out of these marriages. It is evident that there are two
different time periods and two different issues being addressed under the
Anti-miscegenation statutes in these cases

Analyze how
this statute could have influenced Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954) and the Fourteenth Amendment

There were several cases that came to the
Supreme Court, from the states of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and
Delaware in regards to segregation in schools. There were several minors who
were represented by attorneys seeking assistance with obtaining admission to
public schools that were located in the minor’s community. The minors did not
want to attend the schools and continue to be segregated. These students had
been denied the opportunity to attend public schooling in their communities due
to laws that were in place that allowed segregation by race. All of the lower
courts in each state denied the minors admission, with the exception of
Delaware who only allowed the minors in Delaware to be admitted to the public
schools because of their superiority to the African American schools.
Ultimately Delaware joined the other states in requesting to have the U.S.
Supreme Court review the cases. In this case it was the denial of admission to
public schools in the minor’s communities based only on race, a violation of
their Fourteenth Amendment rights?  Yes.

All of the justices agreed that denying
the minor African American students admission to the public schools in their
communities based solely on their race was a violation of their Fourteenth
Amendment rights. This right would be located in the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The justices agreed that although the states were
providing separate but equal school settings they were still violating the
rights of the minors. The justices stated that segregating African American
children in public school systems would continue to make them feel inferior.
The justices also felt that having separate but equal school settings would
affect the minors socially and psychologically. They also agreed that separate
but equal was unequal either way it was observed in the circumstance of public
education.

Separate Opinion(s): There were no
separate opinions in Brown v. Board of Education. However there were questions
that arose while the justices were deciding the case. All of the justices
obviously were oppose to segregation in the public school system, but they
questioned whether the Constitution gave the Supreme Court the power to change
the segregation laws. After careful analysis the justices came to the
conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment did give them the power to put
segregation to an end.

Explain the significance
of this statute to the Defense of Marriage Act (DOM).

The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA enacted
on September 21, 1996, 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28
U.S.C. § 1738C) is a United States federal law that allows states to
refuse to recognize same-sex marriages granted under the laws of other states.
Hence marriages of opposite sexes have to be relaxed  and accepted. This brought into effect the
need of the Anti-Miscegenation
Statutes.

The Defense of Marriage Act is an act that
was passed in 1996, making it illegal for the federal government to recognize
same sex marriages. The sanctity of marriage between a man and woman should be
protected because children need a male and female role model in their lives,
children will start to be taught that homosexuality is actually a good thing,
and it will keep the traditional definition of marriage intact. Being exposed
to both the male and female sex, is important to the developmental needs of
children because it helps to form their sexual identity.

Being raised by parents of the same sex
can make a difference in the way the child is developed. Even newborn infants
can distinguish the differences between a male and female. A study by Susan
Turrell found that relationship violence was a significant problem for
homosexuals. 40 percent of gay men reported having experienced violence in
their relationship; 13 percent reported sexual violence and 83 percent reported
emotional abuse. (vol 13, pp 281-293). A researcher named Henry Biller and
written several books on this topic: Even if the father and mother behave in
generally similar ways, they provide contrasting images for the infant …
Mothers and fathers have different verbal styles when communicating.

Involved fathers are more likely to
stimulate the infant to explore and investigate new objects whereas mothers
tend to engage their infants in relatively pre-structured and predictable
activities. The father and mother offer the child two different kinds of
persons to learn about as well as providing separate sources of love and
support. (Fathers: A Diverse Group) If heterosexual marriage remains protected,
children will at least have the benefit of stabilized familial relationships.

References

Davis,
A. (2006). Bill requires gay’s history to be taught: STATE SENATOR WANTS CALIFORNIA
TO LEAD WAY. San Jose Mercury News (CA), Retrieved Thursday, January 27, 2015
from the Newspaper Source database.

 

Federal
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
http://gaylife.about.com/cs/gaymarriage/i/doma.htm

Maggie,
Gallagher. Testimony United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary

 

“What
is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan Defense of Marriage Act of 1996?”

 

September
4, 2003.http://judiciary.senate.gov/print_testimony.cfm?id=906=2540

 

Roopnarine,
J. (2004). Fathers: A Diverse Group. PsycCRITIQUES, Retrieved Thursday, January
25, 2015 from the PsycINFO database.

 

Turrell,
Susan. “A descriptive analysis of Same-Sex Relationship Violence for a
Diverse Sample,” Journal of Family Violence (vol 13, pp 281-293).

 

Szypszak,
C. (2011). Understanding law for public administration. Boston: Jones &
Barlett.

http://laws.findlaw.com/us/106/583.html

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0388_0001_ZO.html